We propose a new security class, called plaintext-simulatability, defined over the public-key encryption schemes. The notion of plaintext simulatability (denoted PS) is similar to the notion of plaintext awareness (denoted PA) [2], but it is, "properly", a weaker security class for public-key encryption. It is known that PA implies the class of CCA2-secure encryption (denoted IND-CCA2) but not vice versa. In most cases, PA is "unnecessarily" strong -In such cases, PA is only used to prove that a public-key encryption scheme is CCA2-secure, because it looks much easier than to prove "directly" that the scheme meets IND-CCA2. We show that PS also implies IND-CCA2, while preserving a good view of the security proofs as well as PA. Recently, a couple of schemes [9, 15, 1] have been proposed, that have been proven to be CCA2 secure in the random oracle model but they lie outside PA. However, they have been "heuristically" proven and so there is no general observation that looks over those schemes and extracts the essence of those security proofs. Not only does PS provide a good perspective of the security proof for an actual encryption scheme, but it is also more desirable from a theoretical viewpoint, because PA is obviously associated with non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge [20] that is achieved under the existence of dense secure public-key cryptosystems [19] which seem to be stronger than the general assumptions, whereas PS is associated with non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for membership of a language that can be achieved just under the general assumption that trap-door functions exist. Finally, we suggest a few interesting encryption schemes. One is a random-oracle version of Dolev-Dwork-Naor's encryption scheme [6, 7] . Unlike the original scheme, this construction is efficient. The other is a public-key encryption scheme based on a strong pseudo-random permutation family [12] which provides the optimal ciphertext lengths for verifying the validity of ciphertexts, i.e., (ciphertext size) = (message size) + (randomness size). According to [15] , such a construction remains open. Both schemes meet PS but not PA.
Introduction
Plaintext-awareness (denoted PA) is a security class for public-key encryption (mostly defined in the random oracle model), which implies the class of the CCA2-secure encryption, denoted IND-CCA2 [17, 2] . The notion of PA was suggested in [3] and later formalized in [2] .
The key property of the notion of plaintext-awareness is, roughly said, that nobody can produce a new ciphertext without knowing the plaintext. Informally, we say that a publickey encryption scheme is plaintext aware if it is secure (indistinguishable) against chosenplaintext attacks (IND-CPA), in addition to satisfying the above property. PA implies IND-CCA2 [2] -Intuitively, it comes from the following idea: If the target encryption scheme is plaintext aware, an adversary is aware of the decryption of the ciphertexts he has submitted to the decryption oracle. Hence, the adversary cannot get any additional information from the decryption oracle because he already knows the corresponding plaintexts. Therefore, we can transform an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack against the target encryption scheme into a chosen-plaintext attack against the same encryption scheme. Hence, if the scheme is secure in the IND-CPA sense, it would be also secure in the IND-CCA2 sense.
The opposite direction does not hold -IND-CCA2 does not imply PA. Paper [2] provides an "artificial" counter-example to prove this fact, whereas we can suggest a few "natural" counter-examples later.
In most cases, PA is merely a "means" rather than a "goal" -a tool to prove that a public-key encryption scheme is CCA2-secure, because it looks much easier to prove that a scheme meets PA than to prove "directly" that it meets IND-CCA2. So far, only an exception that requires the full power of PA is known in the literature [11] , but the application makes sense only in a restricted computational model, so called the Dolev-Yao model [8] .
In the ordinary adversary model for cryptographic protocols, no application using the fulladvantage of PA has been published. Namely, PA is "unnecessarily" strong in the most cases. So far, a large number of generic methods for constructing CCA2-secure encryption schemes in the random oracle model have been proposed and it is true that most of them belong to the class of PA. It could be, however, explained by the fact that PA is the only criterion to "systematically" create a CCA2-secure encryption scheme in the random oracle model. Meanwhile, a few schemes proposed recently such as [9, 15, 1] are CCA2-secure (in the random oracle model) but not PA, though the authors do not mention that fact. Security for those schemes was proven "heuristically" in each proposal. In other words, there is no observation that looks over those schemes and extracts the essence of those security proofs.
The notion of PA might be possibly too strong from another viewpoint. Obviously PA has a strong analogy with the notion of CPA security (semantic security) coupled with a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system of knowledge of the plaintext, suggested in [4, 20] 1 . The existence of a NIZKP system of knowledge for a NP relation is assured under the existence of a dense secure public-key cryptosystem [19] which has not been proven weaker than or equivalent to the general assumption (that trap-door functions exist). Therefore, the previous CCA2-secure encryption schemes such as [7, 18, 14] , which stand in the standard model under the general assumption (that trap-door functions exist), do not depend on NIZKP systems of knowledge, but on NIZKP systems for membership of languages (because they exist if trap-door functions exist). Here the point is the following: Suppose that one suggests a CCA2-secure encryption scheme in the random oracle model under the general assumptions. He must hope that someday he or someone would find a transformation of his scheme into the one in the standard model, while preserving its security. However, it seems hard to modify a secure one if it is a PA encryption scheme, because of the close relation between PA and NIZKP systems of knowledge.
Our results
In this paper, we propose a weaker but still enough strong security class, called "plaintextsimulatability" (denoted PS). The difference of PS from PA is "subtle" in terms of definition, but PS is "properly" weaker than PA and stronger than IND-CCA2. As well as PA, PS can also give the designers of the schemes a better view of the security proofs: Namely, one can treat "independently" or "orthogonally" the indistinguishability of the encryption and the simulation of decryption.
Technically speaking, if the simulation of decryption is perfect or statistically close to real decryption, the proof that PS implies IND-CCA2 is a natural extention of the proof that PA implies IND-CCA2 in [2] . However, if the simulation of decryption is only computationally indistinguishable from the real decryption, the proof is more involved.
We present a few "natural" examples that lie in the gap between PA and PS. It also means that they lie in the gap between PA and IND-CCA2, because PS implies IND-CCA2. In [2] , they contrived an "artificial" encryption scheme to show that PA is "properly" stronger than IND-CCA2, whereas ours are more natural examples in the gap.
The PS encryption schemes in Sec. 6 are of independent interest. One is an encryption scheme "interpreted in the random oracle model" from Dolev-Dwork-Naor's encryption scheme [6, 7] . One is a public-key encryption scheme that provides the optimal ciphertext lengths for verifying validity of ciphertexts, i.e., (ciphertext size) = (message size) + (randomness size).
PS looks "properly" stronger than IND-CCA2. So far, however, it is not sure how to prove this, and so this remains open.
Preliminary
We begin with some notations.
We write x := a to denote the operation of assigning the value of a to the variable x. Let X be a probability space on some finite set S(⊂ {0, 1} * ). We denote by x ← X the operation of sampling an element of S according to the distribution of X, and assigning the result of this experiment to the variable x. We also write, for some finite set S , x ← R S to denote the operation of sampling an element of S uniformly, and assigning the result of this experiment to the variable x.
For probability spaces, X 1 , . . . , X k , and k-ary predicate φ, we write Pr[x 1 ← X 1 ; x 2 ← X 2 ; · · · : φ(x 1 , . . . , x k )] to denote the probability that the predicate φ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) is true after the experiments, "x 1 ← X 1 ; x 2 ← X 2 ; · · · ", are executed in that order. In this case, it is important that x 1 , . . . , x k are sampled in that order. Let , τ : N → [0, 1](⊂ R) be positive [0, 1]-valued functions. We say that (k) is negligible in k if, for any constant c, there exists a constant, k 0 ∈ N, such that (k) < (1/k) c for any k > k 0 . We say that τ (k) is overwhelming in k if (k) 1 − τ (k) is negligible in k. Let f, g : N → R. We write f (k) ∈ O(g(k)) to denote that there is a constant c > 0 such that f (k) ≤ cg(k) for every sufficiently large k. We write g(k) ∈ Ω(f (k)) to denote that there is a constant c > 0 such that g(k) ≥ cf (k) for every sufficiently large k.
Syntax of encryption schemes
A public-key encryption scheme is given by a triple of algorithm, Π = (K, E, D), where, for every sufficiently large k ∈ N, -K, the key-generation algorithm, is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which on input 1 k outputs a pair of strings, (pk, sk) ∈ PK × SK, where PK × SK is the product set of all possible corresponding public and secret keys generated by applying 1 k to K. This experiment is written as (pk, sk) ← K(1 k ). For given pk (and possibly k), the message and coin spaces, MSP and COIN, of Π are uniquely determined.
-E, the encryption algorithm, is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes a public key pk ∈ PK and a message x ∈ MSP, draws a string r uniformly from the coin space COIN, and produces a string y := E pk (x; r). This experiment is written as y ← E pk (x). -D, the decryption algorithm, is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that takes a secret key sk ∈ SK and a string y ∈ {0, 1} * , and returns a string x := D sk (y).
We further require that a public-key encryption scheme should be complete in the following sense: For every sufficiently large k ∈ N that Π can be defined on, it always holds that D sk (E pk (x)) = x, for every (pk, sk) ∈ PK × SK and every x ∈ MSP. A string pk is called valid for Π with k, if pk ∈ PK for k.
CPA/CCA2-Security
We briefly recall the security notions for public-key encryption, called CPA-security (IND-CPA) and CCA2-security (IND-CCA2), following [17, 2] . Let Π = (K, E, D) be a public-key encryption scheme. For Π, we consider the following games, CPA and CCA2 games. In both games, adversary A takes two modes, "find" and "guess". A always starts with the find mode and then takes the guess mode. A start by taking pk and ends up the find mode by outputting two messages, x 0 , x 1 ∈ MSP. A takes y * and enters the guess mode, where b is a random challenge bit and y * is computed as y * ← E pk (x b ). In the CCA-2 game, at both modes, A can make access to the decryption oracle, D sk (·), at any time with any sequence of queries for decryption, whereas, in the CPA game, A cannot make access to the decryption oracle. The only restriction is that she cannot query the oracle on the challenge ciphertext y * in the guess mode. Finally she ends up the guess mode by outputs b . The advantage of A indicates how much better she can guess the value b than 1 2 , namely 2 Pr[b = b ] − 1. The random oracle version of this security notion is defined by allowing A to query a random oracle (s). We define by Hash a family of all the maps from an appropriate domain to an appropriate range. The domain and range depend on the underlying encryption scheme. For simplicity, even if we draw different random functions, G and H, from different function families, Hash G and Hash H , we just write G, H ← R Hash to denote the experiment.
In the following, we formally define these security notions in the random oracle model.
be a public-key encryption scheme. Let A be an adversary for Π. For k ∈ N, denote the success event of A for Π by
We then define the advantage of A for Π as
We say that Π is secure in the IND-ATK sense (or ATK-secure for short) if, for every polynomial-time (in k) adversary A, Adv atk A,Π (k) is negligible in k, where atk = {cpa, cca2}.
Plaintext Awareness
For completeness, we recall the definition of plaintext awareness, following [2] . Plaintextawareness is defined in the random oracle model. A knowledge extractor for a public-key encryption scheme is defined as follows. Let Π = (K, E, D) be a public-key encryption scheme. Let B and K be algorithms, called an adversary and a knowledge extractor, respectively. We describe their specifications here:
-B on input pk makes access to random oracle H and encryption oracle E H pk , and, after that, finally outputs string y ∈ Y, where
• T H denotes the entire interaction between B and H, and • Y denotes the set of all "answers" made by E H pk (·). The experiment that we get (T H , Y, y) by running B with pk is written as 
We then denote the advantage of K for Π and B by
We say that K is a knowledge extractor for Π if, for every polynomial-time algorithm B, K runs in polynomial-time and Adv ke K,B,Π (k) is overwhelming in k.
This formal definition of the knowledge extractor yields the security class of plaintextawareness.
Definition 3. [Plaintext Awareness] [2]
Let Π = (K, E, D) be a public-key encryption scheme. We say that Π is secure in the sense of PA if Π is secure in the sense of IND-CPA and there is a knowledge extractor for Π.
Plaintext Simulatability
We introduce the security notion of plaintext simulatability (denoted PS). First, we introduce an algorithm, called the knowledge simulator, which is similar to the knowledgeextractor. The notable differences from the knowledge extractor are twofold:
-The knowledge simulator is allowed to make access to the random oracle H to produce the decryption of given ciphertext. -The output of the knowledge simulator is needed to be computationally indistinguishable from the real decryption of given ciphertext (over the random choice of H) against any distinguisher algorithm (even given the corresponding secret key).
Reminder: In the notion of PA, the knowledge extractor is not allowed to make access to the random oracle and its output must be the same as the real decryption of the given ciphertext.
A knowledge simulator for a public-key encryption scheme is defined as follows. Let Π = (K, E, D) be a public-key encryption scheme. Let B, K and C be algorithms, called an adversary, a knowledge simulator, and a distinguisher, respectively. We describe their specifications here:
• T H denotes the entire interaction between B and H, and • Y denotes the set of all "answers" made by E H pk (·). The experiment that we get (T H , Y, y) by running B with pk is written as
Here we insist that the interaction between E H pk and H is not included in T H . -K, on input (T H , Y, y, pk), makes access to random oracle H, and finally outputs string
x.
Informally, algorithm K is a knowledge simulator if the output of K as given above is (computationally) indistinguishable from the "real" decryption, over the random choice of H. -C, on input (T H , Y, y, pk, sk, X), outputs just one bit, where X denotes a random string of the size of the plaintext, possibly representing K H (T H , Y, y, pk) or D H sk (y).
We formalize this notion as follows. For k ∈ N, denote the advantage of K for Π, B and C by
We say that K is a knowledge simulator for Π if, for all polynomial-time (in k) algorithms, B and C, K runs in polynomial-time in k and Adv ks K,B,C,Π (k) is overwhelming in k.
Remark 1. The reader might think that to give the distinguisher C the private key sk looks a little bit tricky, but it is definitely necessary. If C is not given sk, C has no advantage over adversary A. Then for any query y whose plaintext is not open via the interaction between A and H, C cannot distinguish the decryption of y from any garbage message (if Π is at least IND-CPA secure). Indeed, sk is essential in the proof of Lemma 2, which states that PS implies IND-CCA2.
Definition 5. We say that ks (·) is the knowledge simulation error function for Π if there is a knowledge simulator K for Π and, for all polynomial time (in k) algorithms, B and C, Adv ks K,B,C,Π (k) ≥ 1 − ks (k).
The advantage of distinguisher C is upper-bounded by the knowledge simulation error function for Π. To prove this, we define some notations. For probability space X and distinguisher C, let us define p C
For Π, B, C, and K mentioned above, we define
where X denotes the probability space specified by the sequence of the random variables,
and Y denotes the probability space specified by the sequence of the random variables,
Lemma 1. Let K be a knowledge simulator for Π. Let ks (·) be a knowledge simulation error function for Π. Then, for every polynomial-time algorithms B and C,
We define the security notion of plaintext simulatability as follows. 
PS implies IND-CCA2
In the following, we show that PS implies IND-CCA2.
The proof follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let Π be a public-key encryption scheme that is secure in the PS sense. For every IND-CCA2 adversary A against Π, we can construct IND-CPA adversary A against
the same Π such that they satisfy the following relation:
where q denotes the total number of queries of A to the decryption oracle and ks (·) denotes the knowledge simulation error function for Π defined in Def. 5.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that we have adversary A that breaks Π in the IND-CCA2 sense in the random oracle model. We then construct adversary A that breaks Π in the IND-CPA sense in the random oracle model. Intuitively, the idea is that A runs A and, for the queries of A to the decryption oracle, A uses knowledge-simulator K and random oracle H, to simulate the answers. Formally, to use knowledge simulator K, we construct a sequence of adversaries, B 1 , . . . , B q , where q denotes the total number of queries of A to the decryption oracle. On each transcript of B i , K produces the corresponding plaintext, making access to random oracle H. B 1 runs A until A outputs the first decryption query, where B 1 just hands queries of A to random oracle H and hands the answers of H to A. Each pair of query and answer is put on list T H . When A outputs the first decryption query, B 1 halts and outputs it as a ciphertext. B i , 1 < i, is a similar algorithm except that it uses K, too. It starts by running A. For j-th decryption query made by A, 1 ≤ j < i, B i runs K on the corresponding transcript of B j , to produce the decryption, which is sent to A. When K asks the random oracle H, B i just hands the query to H and replies to K with the answer of H. Each interaction between A and H (via B i ) is put on list T H . B i halts and output the i-th decryption query of A.
In addition, each interaction between K and H (via B i ) is also put on list T H , which is the significant difference from the knowledge extractor in the plaintext awareness setting. B i halts and outputs the i-th decryption query of
The presence of the adversaries, B 1 , . . . , B q , is just "conceptual". In the following, we directly construct A to break Π in the IND-CPA sense, where what we insist on is that the transcript given to K for the i-th decryption is identical to the transcript of B i described above.
Construction. We construct A by using A as a black box as follows.
1.
A is given pk. 2. A runs A with pk in the find mode.
When A asks random oracle H, A submits query h of A to random oracle H and replies
A with the answer H(h). Then A puts (h, H(h)) in T H . 4. When A submits y to the decryption oracle, A runs K with (T H , {}, y, pk) and returns the answer x to A. 5. When A outputs a pair of plaintexts, (x 0 , x 1 ), A outputs the same pair (x 0 , x 1 ). 6. A is given y * := E pk (x b ) where bit b is randomly chosen. 7. A hands y * to A and runs A in the guess mode.
A with the answer H(h). A puts (h, H(h)) in T H . 9. When A submits y to the decryption oracle, A runs K on (T H , {y * }, y, pk) and returns the answer x to A. 10. Finally, A output bit b .
First, to help the reader's comprehension, we analyze a simple case in which A can use a knowledge simulator such that its output is statistically indistinguishable from the real decryption. We will consider then the general case that A can use a knowledge simulator whose output is computationally indistinguishable from the real decryption.
Analysis of the "statistically close" case. As mentioned above, the transcript that A makes for the i-th decryption is identical to the transcript of B i for every i. So, from the definition, K can successfully produce the "real" decryption of every query y except for a negligible error probability, ks (k). Let F be the event that at least one of the replies of A to A is not equal to the "real" decryption. Then it is obvious that Pr[F ] ≤ q ks (k).
If A succeeds in decrypting all the queries of A, it is obvious by construction that the success event of A is identical to the success event of A, namely
Some modification is necessary to make their probability spaces coincide, but we omit the description since it is somewhat trivial. A, B, 
Claim. Let
By applying this claim to our case, we have
Hence, we complete the proof in this case. (Note: Since Adv atk A,Π (k) = 2 Pr[Succ atk A,Π (k)] − 1, the entire error probability becomes double.) Analysis of the "computationally close" case. We now consider the "computationally close"case. As with the statistically close case, the transcript that A makes for the i-th decryption is identical to the transcript of B i for every i. However, each output of K is only computationally indistinguishable from the real decryption of each query (over the choice of H for almost all (pk, sk)). Suppose for contradiction that
Pr[Succ cca2
A,Π (k)] − Pr[Succ cpa A ,Π (k)] > q ks (k).
Then we show that we can construct distinguisher C to distinguish, for some i, random variable
with probability more than ks (k), where T H,i and Y i denote, respectively, the lists, T H and Y, at the time A submitted the i-th query to the decryption oracle and y i denotes the i-th query of A to the decryption oracle. If such a distinguisher exists, it contradicts the assumption that the output of K is computationally indistinguishable from the real decryption. Such distinguisher C can be constructed by the hybrid argument method. Now let us denote by Succ cca2
A,Π (k, i) the success event of A for Π where the first i decryption queries come from the real decryption oracle but the latter answers of the queries come from the simulator. Then obviously Succ cca2 A,Π (k, q) = Succ cca2 A,Π (k) and Succ cca2 A,Π (k, 0) = Succ cpa A ,Π (k).
By (5),
A,Π (k, 0)] > q ks (k).
Hence, for some i, by the hybrid argument,
Note that C is given sk and picks up the challenge bit b by itself. Hence, for some i, C can distinguish, using A as above, random variable S i from random variable R i with at least probability ks (k). This contradicts the original assumption. Hence, (5) is not true. This completes the proof.
PA PS
It is obvious by definition that PA still implies PS, namely PA ⊂ PS. We will now show that PA PS. We propose a public-key encryption scheme, denoted Π 0 , based on one-way permutation. The scheme is CCA2 secure in the random oracle model because it meets PS. At the same time, the scheme is evidence that PS is "properly" weaker than PA, because it does not meet PA. In addition, the scheme exemplifies a more natural example than the one shown in [2] , namely PA is "properly" stronger than IND-CCA2. Encryption. For plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} k , the encryption algorithm with public-key f randomly picks up inner coins σ ∈ {0, 1} k and computes the ciphertext E hy pk (m; σ) as follows.
where e = f (σ) and c = G(σ) ⊕ m. 
If σ, m ∈ {0, 1} k and h = H(σ||e||c), then the decryption algorithm outputs m; otherwise reject the ciphertext.
Π 0 does not meet PA
We prove in the next section that this scheme is CCA2-secure when G and H are modeled as random oracles. However this is not PA at the same time, which we can prove as follows:
Consider an adversary B for Π 0 that takes public-key pk and outputs a ciphertext, after asking queries to the random oracles. The adversary can produce a new ciphertext y = (e, c, h), without knowing the corresponding plaintext in the following way -The adversary just picks up any σ, c ∈ {0, 1} k and computes e = f (σ), using pk = {f }. The adversary submits (σ, e, c) to H to get h = H(σ||e||c), and then submits, not asking G with σ, the ciphertext y = (e, c, h) to the decryption oracle. The decryption for this ciphertext, G(σ)⊕c, is unpredictable, because G(σ) is unpredictable. Hence, the adversary can't be aware of the decryption for this ciphertext before getting it from the decryption oracle. Formally speaking, it is necessary to show that Π 0 is "plaintext-aware", i.e., that one can construct a knowledge-extractor that outputs the value D hy,G,H sk (e, c, h) on the transcript given above, i.e., ((σ, e, c, h) , {}, y, pk). However, if such a knowledge extractor exists for Π 0 , it contradicts the unpredictability of G(σ). Finally, we have the following claim.
Theorem 2. Let Π 0 be the above encryption scheme. There exists a polynomial-time bounded adversary B so that there is no knowledge extractor for Π 0 such that
Proof. Suppose that K is a knowledge extractor for Π 0 . We construct adversary B as mentioned above. We then run K on B's transcript ((σ, e, c, h) , {}, y, pk). If K outputs m , we set G(σ) as m ⊕ c and output it. Since G is a random oracle and K is not allowed to access G, it is obvious by construction that Adv ke K,B,Π 0 (k) ≤ 2 −k , which is negligible in k.
By this theorem, Π 0 does not meet PA.
Π 0 meets PS
We prove that scheme Π 0 is "plaintext-simulatable".
The proof follows from the lemmas below. 
We denote by ow (k) the maximum of Adv ow A,f (k) over all adversaries A who run in polynomial time in k. Lemma 3. Let Π 0 be the scheme mentioned above. For every polynomial time adversary A, we have
Lemma 4. Let ks be the knowledge simulation error function for Π 0 mentioned above. We then have
We give the proofs below. By these two lemmas and theorem 1, it automatically turns out that Π 0 is plaintext-simulatable in the random oracle model. In particular, applying lemma 2 to Π 0 , the following lemma holds.
Lemma 5. Let Π 0 be the scheme mentioned above. For every polynomial time adversary A,
where q denotes the total number of the queries of A to the decryption oracle.
Proofs of Lemmas, 3 and 4
To save space, we first describe common operations in both proofs. Proof of Lemma 3. Let A be a CPA-adversary for Π 0 . We then construct adversary A that attacks the one-wayness of f . A takes e * , picked up uniformly on {0, 1} k . A runs A with pk = {f }. For every query of A to the random oracle(s), A returns the answer to A, following the procedures above. When A outputs (m 0 , m 1 ), A picks up at random c * ∈ {0, 1} k , h * ∈ {0, 1} k and returns (e * , c * , h * ) to A. A outputs σ * and halts if A submits a query to the random oracles with σ * such that e * = f (σ * ).
Denote by AskG * the event that A submits query σ * ( f −1 (e * )) to random oracle G. Similarly, denote by AskH * the event that A submits query (σ * , e, c) to random oracle H where (e, c) = (e * , c * ). Denote by AskG * ∨ H * the event that either AskG * or AskH * occurs.
It is obvious by construction that the distribution of challenge ciphertext (e * , c * , h * ) is independent of the distribution of hidden bit b unless AskG * ∨ H * occurs. Therefore, we have (σ, e, c, h) in T H , search T G to find (σ, g). If it exists, return c ⊕ g, otherwise 3. Query oracle G on σ to get g = G(σ) (where we simulate G as above) and finally return c ⊕ g.
Analysis.
Denote by AskG * the event that B submits query σ * ( f −1 (e * )) to random oracle G. Similarly, denote by AskH * the event that B submits query (σ * , e, c) to random oracle H where (e, c) = (e * , c * ). Denote by AskG * ∨ H * the event that either AskG * or AskH * occurs. Denote by AskH the event that B submits query (σ, e, c) to random oracle H such that e = f (σ) and y = (e, c, h). Assume AskG * ∨ H * does not occur. If AskH occurs, K always succeeds in decrypting y. On the other hand, if AskH does not occur, K always rejects y, whereas the real decryption oracle would reject it except with probability 2 −k , which means that the knowledge simulation error of K, conditional on ¬AskG * ∨ H * ∩ ¬AskH, is bounded by 2 −k .
To sum up, we have 
Other PS Encryption Schemes
In this section, we present two public-key encryption schemes that lie in PS but not in PA. Why these schemes do not meet PA is essentially as the same as why Π 0 above does not meet PA. So we will omit these proofs.
A DDN-based construction of CCA2-secure encryption
The Dolev-Dwork-Naor encryption scheme [6, 7] is CCA2 secure. A concrete description of the scheme is given in the appendix. The key for the security proof is as follows: Let < F * , s * , c * , p * > be the challenge ciphertext. Since F * is the verification key of secure signature scheme Σ in the sense of [10] , the adversary cannot produce signature s on (c, p) such that (c, p) = (c * , p * ). For F = F * , the public key e v 1 1 , . . . , e v n n happens to be different from e v * 1 1 , . . . , e v * n n with overwhelming probability where v 1 · · · v n = h(F ) and v * 1 · · · v * n = h(F * ). Hence, the simulator can decrypt < F, s, c, p > such that F = F * , using a secret key d v * i i such that v * i = v i . The following scheme is an interpretation of the Dolev-Dwork-Naor encryption scheme in the random oracle model. When F = F * , the session key H happens to be different from H * with overwhelming probability. This is a point that allows the knowledge simulator to simulate the decryption of the ciphertext in the scheme.
Let f : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k be a trap-door permutation over {0, 1} k . Let H : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k be a hash function modeled as a random oracle. We denote by Σ = (G, S, V ) a signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen message attacks [10] (For instance, if Σ is the Schnorr signature, the total encryption scheme is efficient and secure in the random oracle model).
